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17 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
18 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
19 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

20 WINDING CREEK SOLAR LLC,

21 Plaintiff,

22 v.

23 MICHAEL FLORIO, CATHERINE  
SANDOVAL, CARLA PETERMAN,  
24 MICHAEL PICKER, and LIANE  
RANDOLPH, in their official capacity as  
25 Commissioners of the California Public  
Utilities Commission,

26 Defendants.  
27

Case No. 3:13-04934-JD

**PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO AMICUS  
BRIEF OF PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC  
CO. ET AL.**

[Leave to File Granted by  
ECF No. 104, Nov. 16, 2015 Order ]

Judge: Hon. James Donato

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28

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... ii

TABLE OF ACRONYMS ..... iv

INTRODUCTION ..... 1

ARGUMENT ..... 4

I. THE RE-MAT PROGRAM VIOLATES PURPA BECAUSE IT IS CAPPED AND BECAUSE ITS RATE IS NOT BASED ON THE UTILITIES’ AVOIDED COSTS. .... 4

II. THE STANDARD CONTRACT CANNOT CURE THE RE-MAT PROGRAM’S VIOLATIONS OF PURPA ..... 6

    A. The Re-MAT, Not the Standard Contract, Is California’s Program Offering a Rate Calculated at the Time the Obligation Is Incurred..... 7

    B. Plaintiff Is Not Attacking the Legality of the Standard Contract, and Thus the Utilities’ Exhaustion Argument Is Misplaced..... 11

    C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to a Rate Under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)..... 12

CONCLUSION..... 14

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
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22  
23  
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25  
26  
27  
28

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**CASES**

*Exelon Wind 1, LLC v. Nelson*, 766 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2014).....4, 13  
*JD Wind 1, LLC*, 130 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2010).....14  
*Otter Creek Solar LLC*, 143 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2013) .....9  
*Winding Creek Solar LLC*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,103 (2015)..... 11-12

**STATUTES**

16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) .....1, 4  
 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).....1, 5, 7  
 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25741(a)(1) .....4, 13  
 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.12(e).....4, 13  
 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20 .....5, 12  
 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(b)(4).....4, 13  
 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(d)(1).....4, 13  
 Vt. Admin. Code 18-1-10:4.103(A)(7) .....10  
 Vt. Admin. Code 18-1-10:4.104(E)(2) .....10  
 Vt. Admin. Code 18-1-10:4.104(E)(5) .....10

**OTHER AUTHORITIES**

18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6).....1, 5  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a).....1, 4  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2).....1, 5, 7  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) .....13  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(1).....12  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2).....1, 13  
 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(i).....2, 3, 6, 8, 12, 13  
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 OpenNat.asp?fileID=13309014](http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/OpenNat.asp?fileID=13309014) .....11

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**TABLE OF ACRONYMS**

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| CPUC   | California Public Utilities Commission   |
| FERC   | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission   |
| MWh    | megawatt-hour  |
| PG&E   | Pacific Gas & Electric Company   |
| PURPA  | Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978                                 |
| QF     | Qualifying Facility  |
| Re-MAT | Renewable Market Adjusting Tariff  |
| SRAC   | short-run avoided cost, which is the pricing formula for the Standard Contract |

1 On November 16, 2015, the Court issued an order inviting briefs from potential *amici*  
2 *curiae*. The parties issued the invitation to more than a dozen parties. One brief was filed, by  
3 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (“PG&E”), Southern California Edison Co., and San Diego Gas &  
4 Electric Co., collectively, “the Utilities.” *See* ECF No. 109 (“Utilities Br.”). Pursuant to the  
5 Court’s order, Plaintiff Winding Creek Solar LLC (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this  
6 response.

### 7 INTRODUCTION

8 As Plaintiff has explained in its other briefs, *see* ECF No. 89 (“Pltf. Mem.”) at 2-3, the  
9 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) and FERC’s implementing regulations  
10 impose three requirements on California relevant to this case. *First*, the state’s rules must  
11 require a utility to purchase *any* electricity made available to it by a Qualifying Facility (“QF”).  
12 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a). *Second*, the rate paid by the utility must be equal  
13 to its avoided costs—that is, the amount the utility would have spent buying electricity from  
14 another source but for its purchase from the QF. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R. §  
15 292.304(b)(2); 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6). *Third*, the QF selling pursuant to a contract must be  
16 able to choose between two different ways of calculating the avoided-cost rate. At the “option of  
17 the [QF],” the rate may be “based on *either*: (i) The avoided costs calculated at the time of  
18 delivery; *or* (ii) The avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” 18 C.F.R.  
19 § 292.304(d)(2) (emphasis added).

20 To be sure, a state may make multiple programs available to QFs, and there is no  
21 requirement that each single program must satisfy all of these requirements. But taken as a  
22 whole, the state’s programs must allow a QF to sell to the utility (1) *any* electricity it produces,  
23 (2) *at an avoided-cost rate* that (3) *at the QF’s election*, is based on either the avoided costs  
24 calculated at the time of delivery or the avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is  
25 incurred. None of this is disputed.

26 To meet its PURPA obligations, California has made two programs available to QFs like  
27 Plaintiff. One program is the Re-MAT; the other is the Standard Contract (also called the  
28 Standard Offer Contract). The Standard Contract is uncapped, but—as Plaintiff has explained—

1 its rate can be calculated only at the time of delivery. As Dr. Jonathan Lesser elaborated in  
2 detail, and as Defendants admit, the Standard Contract rate is based on a formula consisting of  
3 variables, such as the price of natural gas and the market price of electricity, the values of which  
4 fluctuate over time. *See* ECF No. 89-1 (“Lesser Decl.”) ¶¶ 63-64, 69-83; ECF No. 90 (“CPUC  
5 Opp. Mem.”) at 19 (admitting that the “actual values to be applied” under the Standard Contract  
6 rate formula “will not be known until delivery of the energy”). Thus, the Standard Contract rate  
7 for any particular month cannot be “*calculated*” until the electricity is actually delivered that  
8 month. *See* 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(i) (emphasis added).

9 For a QF that wishes to elect a rate that can be calculated at the time the utility’s  
10 purchase obligation is incurred, that is, when the contract is signed, *see id.* § 292.304(d)(2)(ii),  
11 California has offered the Re-MAT program. Under that program, a QF may require a utility to  
12 enter a contract for 10, 15, or 20 years at a fixed rate that is known and calculated at the time the  
13 contract is signed. The current rate is \$61.23/MWh. But the Re-MAT program is capped.  
14 Moreover, the Re-MAT rate is not based on the utility’s avoided costs. For these two reasons,  
15 the Re-MAT program conflicts with the state’s obligations under PURPA.

16 The Utilities’ brief is perhaps most remarkable for what it does *not* argue. Like  
17 Defendants, the Utilities do not defend the Re-MAT program’s caps on their own terms. They  
18 do not provide any justification for these caps, or any explanation for why these caps are  
19 consistent with the statutory purpose of PURPA, which was to eliminate barriers to renewable  
20 generation. Even more strikingly, the Utilities do not even attempt to defend the rate paid by the  
21 Re-MAT program as one that is based on their avoided costs. Plaintiff has argued that the Re-  
22 MAT rate has nothing to do with how much the utility would have spent from some other source,  
23 but for its obligation to buy from QFs. Instead, as Defendants admit, the Re-MAT rate adjusts  
24 every two months by a CPUC-determined amount “based on the market response” *by QFs* “to  
25 the previously offered price,” so that the price drops if QFs are willing to sell more than 5 MW at  
26 the previous price. CPUC Opp. Mem. at 10. The Utilities, of course, know what their avoided  
27 costs are better than anyone else. If the Re-MAT program’s rate were truly based on their

28

1 avoided costs, presumably they would say so. Tellingly, *they offer no argument that the Re-*  
2 *MAT price is based on their avoided costs.*

3        Instead of defending the Re-MAT program on its own terms, the Utilities offer  
4 essentially the same defense as Defendants: They ask the Court to ignore the Re-MAT program's  
5 illegalities on the ground that Plaintiff can always sell under the Standard Contract. But, as  
6 discussed at length in Plaintiff's previous briefs and in Dr. Lesser's report, *see* Pltf. Mem. at 16-  
7 18; ECF No. 95 ("Pltf. Reply") at 4-6; Lesser Decl. ¶¶ 63-64, 69-83, the Standard Contract  
8 program does not offer a rate that can be "*calculated* at the time the obligation is incurred." 18  
9 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). Its rate can be calculated only "at the time of  
10 delivery." 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(i). Thus, the Standard Contract alone cannot satisfy  
11 California's obligation to give QFs a *choice* between these two types of avoided-cost  
12 calculations.

13        The Utilities claim that Plaintiff is procedurally barred from attacking the Standard  
14 Contract rate because Plaintiff did not present any such complaint at FERC. *See* Utilities Br. 1,  
15 8-11. But the Utilities misapprehend the point. Plaintiff is not attacking the Standard Contract  
16 rate. There is nothing illegal about the Standard Contract. It is a perfectly acceptable program  
17 for those QFs that wish to choose a rate based on avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery.  
18 But California still must offer some other program under which QFs may choose a rate  
19 calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.

20        The Re-MAT is designed to be such a program: it offers a rate calculated at the time the  
21 obligation is incurred. It pays a fixed dollar amount for the duration of the contract—a rate that  
22 is known and calculated when the contract is signed. But in order for the Re-MAT program to  
23 satisfy California's PURPA obligations, it must be uncapped. The Re-MAT program, however,  
24 not only is capped; it is capped at a mere 5 MW every two months. Moreover, the Re-MAT  
25 program's rate must be based on the utility's avoided costs, and it is not. Thus, although the Re-  
26 MAT program *does* offer a rate "calculated at the time the obligation is incurred," 18 C.F.R.  
27 § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), that rate is not an avoided cost rate, and a QF will not necessarily be able to  
28



1 obtain the rate if the bimonthly or overall caps have already been reached. That is why Plaintiff  
2 is challenging the Re-MAT program, and not the Standard Contract.

3 Finally, the Utilities promote the novel theory—never advanced by Defendants—that, as  
4 a matter of state law, Plaintiff might not be eligible for a rate under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2),  
5 which applies to sales pursuant to a “legally enforceable obligation.” Utilities Br. 12-16. There  
6 is a good reason why Defendants have never made this argument: it is flat wrong. As the  
7 Utilities note, under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in *Exelon Wind 1, LLC v. Nelson*, 766 F.3d 380  
8 (5th Cir. 2014), a state may decide whether to impose a legally enforceable obligation on utilities  
9 to contract with non-firm resources such as solar generators. Texas made the choice not to  
10 impose such an obligation, and the Fifth Circuit upheld that choice as permissible. Even  
11 assuming that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was correct, California has made a different choice  
12 than Texas. Under Section 399.20, the state statute that the Re-MAT program implements, the  
13 California legislature mandated that the state’s utilities offer contracts “for a period of 10, 15, or  
14 20 years, as authorized by the commission.” Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(d)(1). These  
15 contracts must be made available to “eligible renewable energy resource[s],” *id.* § 399.20(b)(4),  
16 a term that includes non-firm sources such as wind and solar. *See* Cal. Pub. Util. Code  
17 § 399.12(e); Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25741(a)(1). Thus, under California law, the utilities have a  
18 legally enforceable obligation to contract with Plaintiff. Plaintiff is therefore eligible for a rate  
19 under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2).

## 20 ARGUMENT

### 21 I. THE RE-MAT PROGRAM VIOLATES PURPA BECAUSE IT IS CAPPED AND 22 BECAUSE ITS RATE IS NOT BASED ON THE UTILITIES’ AVOIDED COSTS.

23 Strikingly, like Defendants, the Utilities make no effort to defend the Re-MAT program  
24 on its own terms. They do not dispute that, under PURPA, a state must implement rules  
25 requiring a utility to purchase *any* electricity made available to it by a QF. 16 U.S.C.  
26 § 824a-3(a); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a). Nor do they dispute that limiting a utility’s purchase  
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28

1 requirement—for example, to 750 MW overall state-wide, or to 5 MW per utility in any two-  
2 month period—violates PURPA.<sup>1</sup>

3 Moreover, like Defendants, the Utilities do not dispute that the rate charged under  
4 PURPA must be equal to the utility’s avoided costs. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R.  
5 § 292.304(b)(2); *id.* § 292.101(b)(6). And, perhaps most strikingly of all, the Utilities—who  
6 know what their avoided costs actually are—do not dispute Plaintiff’s argument that the Re-  
7 MAT rate is ultimately based on QFs’ production costs, not the utility’s avoided costs. The  
8 Utilities offer no defense whatsoever of the Re-MAT rate as an avoided cost rate. *See* Utilities  
9 Br. 16 (“The Utilities are not offering an opinion as to whether the ReMAT Program pricing  
10 mechanism constitutes an ‘avoided cost’ rate...”). Thus, the Court can readily conclude based  
11 on the undisputed law and facts that, taken by itself, the Re-MAT program violates PURPA.

12 Rather than defending the Re-MAT program as consistent with PURPA, the Utilities  
13 argue that the Re-MAT program was adopted for the purpose of complying with state law,  
14 namely, Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20, and not in order to comply with PURPA. Utilities Br. 3  
15 (“Section 399.20 was not intended to be a vehicle for implementation of PURPA.”).

16 That is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because, as the CPUC’s own Orders  
17 make crystal clear, the Re-MAT program was intended to faithfully implement PURPA as well  
18 as state law. *See* ECF No. 89-3, Ex. 2 to Decl. of Matthew E. Price (“CPUC May 2012 Order”)  
19 at 39 (stating that “[t]he pricing methodology we adopt today, Re-MAT, complies with both state  
20 and federal law”); *id.* at 11 (stating that “we rely on federal law, specifically, avoided cost  
21 requirements under [PURPA.]”); *id.* at 105 (acknowledging that “this program is developed to be  
22 compliant with PURPA”); *id.* at 117 (stating that the Re-MAT program “compl[ies] with federal  
23 law by requiring, among other things, that all FERC jurisdictional generators participating in the  
24

25 <sup>1</sup> The Utilities question why Plaintiff “does not challenge other limitations on the availability of  
26 the ReMAT Program, including the requirement that eligible projects are renewable resources, 3  
27 MW or less, and ‘strategically located.’” Utilities Br. 8. Plaintiff satisfies those criteria, so it  
28 would have no standing to challenge them. As to whether these eligibility criteria for Re-MAT  
might also violate PURPA, *see id.*, that depends on what programs California offers for QFs that  
do not meet these criteria. California has a myriad of PURPA-related programs for different  
types of QFs, and Plaintiff is not familiar with all of their details. In any event, whether some

1 program register with the FERC as QFs and by adopting a price consistent with PURPA...). It  
 2 is irrelevant because, under the Supremacy Clause, the Re-MAT program *must* comply with  
 3 PURPA, as the CPUC itself has acknowledged. *See id.* at 105 n.83 (“The fundamental premise  
 4 of the pricing proposal adopted today is that the prices reflect avoided costs, which the [CPUC]  
 5 has authority to set under the PURPA for QFs. In the absence of such federal authority, the  
 6 Commission would not have jurisdiction to establish the wholesale [Re-MAT] prices.”).

7       Instead of trying to justify the Re-MAT program as a permissible implementation of  
 8 PURPA, the Utilities (like Defendants) instead argue that the Re-MAT need not comply with  
 9 PURPA “because there are other reasonably available means for QFs to sell power.” Utilities  
 10 Br. 4. Specifically, the Utilities argue, “QFs, such as Winding Creek, can sell their capacity  
 11 under the Standard Contract.” *Id.* at 7. Thus, according to the Utilities, it is “irrelevant” that the  
 12 Re-MAT program is capped and does not offer a rate based on the utility’s avoided costs. *Id.* at  
 13 16-17. For the reasons discussed below, however, the availability of the Standard Contract  
 14 program cannot save the Re-MAT from its legal infirmities.

15 **II. THE STANDARD CONTRACT CANNOT CURE THE RE-MAT PROGRAM’S**  
 16 **VIOLATIONS OF PURPA.**

17       As Plaintiff has repeatedly explained, *see* Pltf. Mem. at 4, 16; Pltf. Reply at 3-6, under  
 18 FERC’s regulations, a QF is entitled to choose between two types of avoided-cost rates under  
 19 which it is able to sell any electricity it generates: one that is “calculated at the time of delivery,”  
 20 and the other that is “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” 18 C.F.R.  
 21 § 292.304(d)(2)(i)-(ii). The availability of the second type of rate is critically important to many  
 22 QFs, since a renewable developer can have difficulty obtaining financing for the construction of  
 23 a renewable generator without having a known and calculable revenue stream in advance of  
 24 delivery.

25       Of course, there is no requirement that each and every program offered by a state must  
 26 allow such a choice. Instead, PURPA only requires that the state’s programs, taken together,

27  
 28 other QF might also have a viable preemption challenge to some other aspect of California’s  
 program is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this case.

1 allow QFs to choose between these rates. Thus, for example, a state could offer two programs to  
 2 QFs—one that pays a rate “calculated at the time of delivery,” and another that pays a rate  
 3 “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” To comply with PURPA, however, both  
 4 programs must be uncapped. If one of the programs were capped, then a QF would not  
 5 necessarily be able to elect that program’s rate to sell its electricity, and thus would not in fact  
 6 enjoy the choice that the regulations mandate be given to QFs. Additionally, both programs’  
 7 rates must be based upon the utility’s avoided costs, as the regulations and statute make clear.  
 8 *See* 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).

9 **A. The Re-MAT, Not the Standard Contract, Is California’s Program Offering**  
 10 **a Rate Calculated at the Time the Obligation Is Incurred.**

11 As the Utilities note, in California, there are two programs available for QFs like  
 12 Plaintiff. Utilities Br. 2-3. One of these programs is the Re-MAT; the other is the Standard  
 13 Contract approved by the CPUC in 2010. The Re-MAT program purports to offer a lawful rate  
 14 “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii). Under the Re-  
 15 MAT, utilities and QFs enter into fixed-price, long-term contracts of 10, 15, or 20 years for a  
 16 known and calculated rate. *See* CPUC May 2012 Order at 43, 46. In the first bimonthly Re-  
 17 MAT program period, that rate was \$89.23/MWh. *See* Pltf. Mem. at 9. Today, that rate is  
 18 \$61.23/MWh.<sup>2</sup> However, as discussed above and in Plaintiff’s previous briefs, the Re-MAT  
 19 program is capped; and, moreover, the rate it offers is not based on the utility’s avoided costs.  
 20 For these reasons, the Re-MAT does not comply with PURPA.

21 Under FERC’s precedent, that might not be a problem if some other California program  
 22 also offered a rate “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred,” 18 C.F.R.  
 23 § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), that was uncapped and based on avoided costs. Then, Plaintiff could sell  
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 25  
 26

27 <sup>2</sup> Pacific Gas & Electric Co., “ReMAT Feed-In Tariff (Senate Bill 32),” Program Period 14  
 28 (begins January 4, 2016), <http://www.pge.com/en/b2b/energysupply/wholesaleelectricitysuppliersolicitation/ReMAT/index.page>.

1 under that other program and the Re-MAT would be merely an “alternative.” *See* Utilities Br. 6-  
 2 7.<sup>3</sup> The problem here is that there is no such other program.


3           The Utilities, like Defendants, repeatedly point to the Standard Contract program, but  
 4 that program does not offer a rate “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” 18 C.F.R.  
 5 § 292.304(d)(2)(ii). It only offers a rate “calculated at the time of delivery.” *Id.*  
 6 § 292.304(d)(2)(i). Defendants have acknowledged as much. They admit that under the  
 7 Standard Contract pricing formula, known as the SRAC, “the actual values to be applied ... will  
 8 not be known until delivery of the energy.” CPUC Opp. Mem. at 19. Dr. Lesser likewise  
 9 explained in detail that the Standard Contract pricing formula “applies variables whose values  
 10 cannot be determined in advance and which are subject to constant change,” such as “the price of  
 11 natural gas at the time the QF’s electricity is delivered; electric supply and demand conditions at  
 12 the time of delivery that determine the wholesale price of electricity at electric market trading  
 13 hubs; and the locational adjustment between the price at a QF’s location and the price at a  
 14 market trading hub at the time of delivery.” *See* Lesser Decl. ¶ 64; *see also id.* ¶¶ 69-83. As a  
 15 result, “the recipient of a Standard Offer contract cannot calculate the rate it will be paid at the  
 16 time the contract is entered.” *Id.* ¶ 64.

17           The Utilities’ only real engagement with this point is to reprise Defendants’ failed  
 18 argument that the Standard Contract offers a formula rate. *See* Utilities Br. 11-12. Like  
 19 Defendants, the Utilities claim that the Standard Contract satisfies Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii)  
 20 because the *formula* is fixed when the contract is entered. *Id.* at 12 (noting that under the  
 21 Standard Contract, the “fixed energy cost *formula* ... [is] known to the QF at the time a contract  
 22 is executed.” (emphasis added)). But, like Defendants, the Utilities simply ignore the plain  
 23 language of that regulation, which requires a rate that can be “*calculated*” at the time the  
 24 obligation is incurred. *See* 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii) (emphasis added); Pltf. Reply Br. at 4-  
 25 6. Because the undisputed facts are that the Standard Contract formula includes variables whose  
 26 values are unknowable until the electricity is ultimately delivered, that formula obviously cannot

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
 28 <sup>3</sup> Provided, however, that the other program offering a rate “calculated at the time the obligation  
 is incurred” did not impose other burdens that in effect eliminated it as a genuine option.

1 constitute a rate that can be “calculated” at the time the obligation is incurred. The Standard  
 2 Contract therefore cannot satisfy Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii).

3 In sum, the Re-MAT is the *only* program available to Plaintiff that purports to offer a rate  
 4 that can be “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii).  
 5 Thus, notwithstanding the Standard Contract, California still needs a lawful Re-MAT program in  
 6 order to comply with PURPA. But, as discussed above, the Re-MAT program violates PURPA  
 7 in two different ways: it is capped, and the rate is not based on avoided costs. Accordingly, the  
 8 Re-MAT program violates PURPA.



20 The Utilities (Br. at 4-6, 16-17) also rely heavily on *Otter Creek Solar LLC*, 143 FERC  
 21 ¶ 61,282 (2013), but that case is no help to them and in fact supports Plaintiff. As Plaintiff  
 22 explained in its reply brief, *see* Pltf. Reply at 9 n.7, *Otter Creek* involved a challenge to a  
 23 Vermont program known as the SPEED program. FERC rejected the challenge, reasoning that  
 24 the SPEED program was merely an “alternative” program made available to QFs. Vermont’s  
 25 main program, the “Rule 4.100 Program,” sufficed to meet the state’s PURPA obligations. *Otter*  
 26 *Creek*, 143 FERC ¶ 61,282, at paras. 3-4.

27 Critically, however, the Rule 4.100 Program—*unlike* California’s Standard Contract  
 28 program—allows QFs to choose a rate under Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii). Specifically, Vermont’s

1 Rule 4.100 program allows QFs to elect a long-term contract with a rate “based on projected  
 2 avoided energy costs associated with various levels of purchases from qualifying facilities ....”  
 3 *See* Vt. Admin. Code 18-1-10:4.104(E)(2).<sup>4</sup> That rate is calculated at the time the contract is  
 4 entered. It is to be determined on a “levelized ... basis,” *id.* 10:4.104(E)(5), which means a rate  
 5 that is the equivalent of “an ... annuity.” Vt. Admin. Code 18-1-10:4.103(A)(7) (defining  
 6 “levelized rate”). To implement the Rule 4.100 program, the Vermont Public Service Board  
 7 publishes a rate sheet which shows the levelized rate that a QF can receive each month for the  
 8 duration of a 5, 10, 15, 20, or 30-year contract.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the Rule 4.100 program allows QFs to  
 9 select a Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii) rate; it does not have any cap; and that rate is based on the  
 10 utility’s avoided costs. Against that backdrop, FERC ruled that the SPEED program was merely  
 11 an “alternative.”

12 The situation here could not be more different. There is no similar rate sheet under the  
 13 Standard Contract program, because the rate that a QF will be paid in the future cannot be  
 14 calculated now. Thus, the “current and historical SRAC energy payments” set forth on the  
 15 PG&E website, CPUC Opp. Mem. at 20,<sup>6</sup> which Defendants submitted with their brief, *see* ECF  
 16 No. 92 (CPUC Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2), lists *historical* SRAC energy prices for each  
 17 month from 1980 through August 2015. But it does not (and cannot) list the price that a QF will  
 18 receive in the future, because the SRAC formula includes variables whose values cannot be  
 19 known until the electricity is ultimately delivered.

20 Consequently, the Re-MAT program is not an “alternative” like Vermont’s SPEED  
 21 program; rather, the Re-MAT is the *only* means by which California purports to comply with the  
 22 requirement to make a Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii) rate available to QFs like Plaintiff. Plaintiff  
 23 pointed out this distinction between this case and *Otter Creek* in its reply brief, *see* Pltf. Reply  
 24 Br. at 9-10 n.7, and tellingly, the Utilities did not address it.

25

26 <sup>4</sup> The relevant Vermont regulations can be found at  
 27 <http://www.state.vt.us/psb/rules/4100boun.htm>.

28 <sup>5</sup> The most current rate sheet is available at  
<http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/424754/26398028/1437057517847/Attachment+1+RATES.pdf>  
 and is attached as Exhibit A for the Court’s convenience.



1 Also telling is the fact that, when the Re-MAT program was adopted by the CPUC, it was  
 2 never described as an “alternative.” Instead, the CPUC believed that it offered an avoided-cost  
 3 rate consistent with Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii). The CPUC stated that the Re-MAT’s “pricing  
 4 methodology *must* also be consistent with federal law on avoided costs for wholesale  
 5 transactions under PURPA.” CPUC May 2012 Order at 39 (emphasis added); indeed, the CPUC  
 6 said it was a “fundamental premise” of the Re-MAT “that the prices reflect avoided costs,”  
 7 because otherwise the CPUC “would not have jurisdiction to establish the [program’s] prices.”  
 8 *Id.* at 105 n.83. The Court should not be fooled by the Utilities *post hoc* attempt to salvage the  
 9 Re-MAT program by recharacterizing it.

10 **B. Plaintiff Is Not Attacking the Legality of the Standard Contract, and Thus**  
 11 **the Utilities’ Exhaustion Argument Is Misplaced.**

12 The Utilities’ argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with  
 13 respect to the Standard Contract, *see* Utilities Br. 10-11, is equally without merit. Plaintiff does  
 14 not contend that the Standard Contract is illegal. The Standard Contract formed no part of  
 15 Plaintiff’s complaint. There was nothing for Plaintiff to exhaust with respect to the Standard  
 16 Contract, because Plaintiff is seeking no relief or remedy with respect to the Standard Contract.  
 17 It is Defendants and the Utilities that have injected the Standard Contract into this case, in an  
 18 effort to recharacterize the Re-MAT program as a mere “alternative” that was never intended to  
 19 comply with PURPA’s requirements.<sup>7</sup>

20  
 21 <sup>6</sup> SRAC, or “short run avoided costs,” is the name of the pricing formula for the Standard  
 Contract. *See* CPUC Opp. Mem. at 11.

22 <sup>7</sup> The Utilities are also incorrect that the Standard Contract was never considered by FERC. As  
 23 intervenors before FERC, the Utilities raised the same argument regarding the Standard Contract  
 24 that it makes here, and Plaintiff addressed that argument in its brief. *See* Answer of Winding  
 25 Creek Solar LLC, *In re Winding Creek Solar LLC*, Docket EL13-71 at 5 (FERC July 18, 2013)  
 (“The QF all-source program [i.e., Standard Contract] to which the CPUC and the California  
 26 Utilities point does not provide a QF with the long-run rate mandated by 18 C.F.R.  
 27 §292.304(d)(2)(ii).”), <http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/OpenNat.asp?fileID=13309014>.  
 FERC later addressed that argument in its “Declaratory Order” declining to initiate an  
 28 enforcement action, stating—without any analysis, discussion of its regulations, or engagement  
 with Plaintiff’s arguments—that “Winding Creek ... may obtain a PURPA long-term, avoided  
 cost legally-enforceable obligation to sell [its] net capacity to [its] host utility pursuant to  
 California’s Standard Contract for QFs 20 MW or Under. Given the availability of [that  
 contract], Winding Creek has not demonstrated that [CPUC’s] implementation of PURPA ... is  
 inconsistent with PURPA and our regulations.” *Winding Creek Solar LLC*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,103,



1 In truth, the Standard Contract is simply a red herring. The Standard Contract is a  
 2 perfectly valid rate under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(i). But the Standard Contract does not offer  
 3 a rate under Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii). Thus, Defendants and the Utilities cannot point to the  
 4 Standard Contract program in order to excuse the Re-MAT's legal infirmities. The CPUC  
 5 offered the Re-MAT program as a rate under Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii), but it capped the  
 6 program and set the rate in a manner having nothing to do with the utility's avoided costs. That  
 7 is why the Re-MAT program is illegal, and that is why Plaintiff is challenging the Re-MAT  
 8 program, and not the Standard Contract.

9 **C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to a Rate Under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2).**

10 Finally, the Utilities raise the question of whether Plaintiff is entitled to a rate under 18  
 11 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2) as a matter of state law. Utilities Br. 12-15. They stop short of arguing  
 12 that Plaintiff is *not* entitled to such a rate; they say merely that it is an open question that the  
 13 CPUC needs to decide. *Id.* at 13 (asserting that the issue is "less clear"). The CPUC, however,  
 14 did not make this argument in opposing summary judgment, and for good reason. The relevant  
 15 statute, Cal. Pub. Utils. Code § 399.20, makes unmistakably clear that Plaintiff is entitled to a  
 16 rate under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2).

17 In suggesting otherwise, the Utilities draw on the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Exelon Wind*,  
 18 766 F.3d 380. As the Utilities recount, that case held that a state may decide whether non-firm  
 19 resources like wind or solar generation facilities should be able to sell their power to utilities  
 20 under a legally enforceable obligation (that is, pursuant to a contract) and receive their choice of  
 21 rate under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(i)-(ii), or instead should be permitted to sell to utilities only  
 22 under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(1). Under Subsection (d)(1), a QF and utility have no contractual  
 23 obligations to one another; the QF is allowed simply to sell to the utility whatever power it

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 25  
 26 para. 7 (2015). For the reasons Plaintiff has already given in its other briefs, that conclusion by  
 27 FERC is flatly contradicted by the plain language of 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), which  
 28 requires that the state make available a rate "calculated at the time the obligation is incurred,"  
 and the admission by the CPUC and the testimony by Dr. Lesser that the Standard Offer rate  
 cannot be *calculated* at the time the obligation is incurred. Accordingly, FERC's conclusion on  
 this issue deserves no deference whatsoever from this Court. *See* Pltf. Mem. at 15-16; Pltf.  
 Reply at 6-10.

1 happens to make available at the prevailing price at the time of sale.<sup>8</sup> The Fifth Circuit held in  
 2 *Exelon Wind* that Texas law did not impose on utilities any legally enforceable obligation to  
 3 contract with non-firm QFs. Instead, those resources were allowed to sell only under Subsection  
 4 (d)(1). And the Fifth Circuit upheld that arrangement as consistent with PURPA. *Exelon Wind*,  
 5 766 F.3d at 395-97.<sup>9</sup>

6 The Fifth Circuit's holding in *Exelon Wind* simply has no bearing here, because  
 7 California has made a different choice than Texas. As the state statute authorizing the Re-MAT  
 8 program makes unmistakably clear, under California law, non-firm QFs *may* impose legally  
 9 enforceable obligations on utilities. The California legislature mandated that the state's utilities  
 10 enter contracts "for a period of 10, 15, or 20 years, as authorized by the commission." Cal. Pub.  
 11 Util. Code § 399.20(d)(1). These contracts must be made available to "eligible renewable  
 12 energy resource[s]." *Id.* § 399.20(b)(4). That term is elsewhere defined to include non-firm  
 13 sources such as wind and solar. *See* Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.12(e); Cal. Pub. Res. Code  
 14 § 25741(a)(1). Indeed, that is the entire predicate of the Re-MAT program, which involves a  
 15 regulatory requirement imposed on utilities to enter contracts with non-firm QFs. Thus, under  
 16 California law, the utilities have a legally enforceable obligation to contract with Plaintiff, and  
 17 Plaintiff is therefore eligible for a rate under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2). The Utilities simply  
 18 miss the mark when they assert that "the CPUC has not yet addressed [this] question." Utilities  
 19 Br. 15. Indeed, PG&E itself has acknowledged that Plaintiff is entitled to such a rate as a matter

20  
 21 <sup>8</sup> From the standpoint of the QF, pricing under Subsection 292.304(d)(1) has advantages and  
 22 disadvantages relative to pricing under Subsection 292.304(d)(2)(i). Both pay a price based in  
 23 avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery. However, under Subsection (d)(1), the QF is not  
 24 contractually bound to sell its output to the utility, and instead may sell its output to a third party  
 25 willing to pay more. But Subsection (d)(2)(i) has the advantage of requiring the utility to pay for  
 both energy (that is, the actual electricity produced) and capacity (which is the capability of  
 producing electricity of called upon). Although resources like wind and solar are considered  
 non-firm, they still do have some capacity value and, accordingly, do receive some capacity  
 payments under Subsection (d)(2)(i).

26 <sup>9</sup> For the reasons given by the thoughtful opinion dissenting in part, the Fifth Circuit erred in  
 27 reaching that conclusion. FERC's regulation is crystal clear that *all* QFs have the option to elect  
 28 a rate under (d)(1) or under (d)(2) (and if they choose (d)(2), to then elect a rate under (d)(2)(i)  
 or (d)(2)(ii)). 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d); *Exelon Wind*, 766 F.3d at 403-05, 409-11, 412 (Prado, J.,  
 concurring in part and dissenting in part). That regulation preempts contrary state law.  
 However, in this case, it is unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the Fifth Circuit was

1 of state law by accepting Winding Creek into the Re-MAT queue, where it still sits in the  
2 number one position. ECF No. 89-2 (Decl. of Thomas Melone) ¶¶ 7, 11.

3 Accordingly, even accepting the holding of *Exelon Wind*, Plaintiff would be entitled to a  
4 rate under Section 292.304(d)(2), and thus entitled to choose between a rate under Section  
5 292.304(d)(2)(i) and a rate under Section 292.304(d)(2)(ii).

6 Finally, contrary to the Utilities’ assertion at the very end of its brief, *see* Utilities Br. 15-  
7 16, Plaintiff does not rely on *JD Wind 1, LLC*, 130 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2010), for any proposition  
8 later undercut or overruled by the Fifth Circuit in *Exelon Wind*.

9 **CONCLUSION**

10 Summary judgment should be granted in favor of Plaintiff.

11  
12 Dated: January 29, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

JENNER & BLOCK LLP

14 By: /s/ Matthew E. Price  
15 Matthew E. Price (*admitted pro hac vice*)  
16 Counsel for Plaintiff Winding Creek Solar LLC

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28 right or wrong. As explained above, California has made a different choice than Texas, and  
allows its non-firm QFs to impose legally enforceable obligations on utilities.